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Abstract Identity governance is an emerging concept for fine-grained condi-
tional disclosure of identity information and enforcement of corresponding
data handling policies. Although numerous technologies underlying identity
management have been developed, people still have difficulty obtaining a clear
picture of how their identity information is maintained, used, and propagated.
An identity management framework is described for tracking the history of
how a person’s identity information is handled after it is transferred across
domains of control and for enforcing meta-policies related to managing iden-
tity information distributed over the Internet. With this framework, orga-
nizations that manage identity information can improve accountability for
their data practices and thereby increase their trustworthiness. The framework
also enables users to control and optimize the propagation of their identity
information in a user-centric manner.
Keywords Identity governance · Policy enforcement · Privacy protection ·
User-centricity
Introduction
Identity management is based on technologies supporting electronic interac-
tions requiring identity information. For example, identity federation technol-
ogy is used to associate an individual’s partial identities stored in disparate
administrative domains on the Internet (OASIS 2005a; OpenID Foundation
2007). This technology enables a person to enhance the management of several
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partial identities spread over multiple systems. Other technologies include
access control methods for granting or denying access to identity information
from a different security domain. An important aspect of these technologies
is that the interacting entities are distributed beyond domain boundaries and
administered by different organizations. Thus, privacy protection is a key issue
in identity management.
An emerging concept in identity management is identity governance
(Liberty Alliance Project 2008). It addresses fine-grained conditional disclo-
sure of identity information and enforcement of policies for handling identity
information. Although there is not yet a uniform definition of the scope
of identity governance in the technology community, identity governance
overlays the supporting technologies and effectively establishes agreement
between business partners handling identity information for compliance and
audit reasons.
A recently developed concept in identity management is user-centricity,
which means enabling a person to control his or her identity information and
the way it is used (Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2007). Although the idea itself is
not new, it has been accepted as a basic guideline for constructing a system
supporting strong user control and privacy protection. In this sense, since
identity governance essentially requires users’ involvement with transactions
related to their identity information, it is desirable that the basic properties
of user-centricity are applied to identity governance systems. A person should
ideally understand all the states of his or her identity information scattered
over the Internet and be able to take appropriate actions regarding them.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult for a person to get a clear picture of how his
or her identity information is maintained, used, and propagated. This can be
illustrated in a use case. Consider a motivating scenario about a patient and his
or her medical information. Although a patient is generally required to provide
personal data and informed consent before receiving medical treatment, it is
difficult for the patient to confirm that the data is used in accordance with
the consent provided. If medical personnel share the patient’s data and clinical
history with another medical facility providing additional service to the patient,
the patient generally does not have a way to find out how the data is used by the
second facility. In addition, medical facilities generally do not have sufficient
means for demonstrating that they handle patient data appropriately.
In light of these considerations, we need a vision and a technical framework
that puts people in control of their identity information and that optimizes
identity propagation, including the types of information propagated, the
organizations that are allowed to receive the information, and the policies
for managing the information. The framework should encompass the broad
perspective of the Internet. Although numerous supporting technologies have
been developed for emerging standardization activities such as identity federa-
tion and personal attribute exchange, there has been little research on identity
governance across domain boundaries from the user’s viewpoint.
In this paper, an identity management framework is described that enables
users to determine the current status and to track the usage history of their
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identity information after it has been propagated from one trusted entity to
another across domains of control. Also described are a scheme comprising
several algorithms that enables users to ensure that their identity information
is handled and propagated in an acceptable way and a mechanism for enforcing
identity management policies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section “Model” introduces
a model of the relationship between identity information and policy. Sec-
tion “Transfer link management” describes the algorithms for managing and
tracking the use of identity information. Section “Enforcement of identity
management policies” describes the enforcement of identity management
policies and constraints. Section “Discussion” discusses several issues related
to identity governance. Section “Related work” describes related work, and
Section “Conclusion and future work” concludes the paper with a summary of
the key points and a look at future work.
Model
In this section, a model is described for managing identity information and
tracking information practices.
A data subject (DS) is an individual to whom personal data relates. A
DS delegates the secure management and effective utilization of his or her
personal data to other entities, specifying preferences governing how the data
is to be handled by them.
A data manager (DM) is an entity that manages the personal data of
DSs on their behalf in accordance with their privacy preferences and in
compliance with its own privacy and security policies. It is responsible for
securely providing other entities with personal data on behalf of a DS. Even
after a DS’s data has been propagated to even more entities, the DM identifies
their information practices in accordance with requests by the DS.
A data consumer (DC) is an entity that uses a DS’s personal data obtained
from a DM. This entity uses the data in a way that conforms to the agreement
reached with the DM on how the data is to be used. It reports to the DM
information on data usage and retention when relevant events have taken
place in order to demonstrate its trustworthiness.
The above definitions of DM and DC are respectively related to the data
controller and data processor definitions commonly used in the data protection
context. DM and DC are different in that a DC has is responsible for handling
personal data in compliance with the agreement it has with the DM whereas
a data processor does not have this responsibility in definitions such as that of
the UK’s Data Protection Act.
The DM and DC are not actual entities; they are simply roles in the model.
Therefore, a single entity can play both roles; that is, a DC entity can act as a
DM entity once it receives and stores personal data. It is assumed that these
entities are trusted and that they comply with the agreement. The purpose of
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this work is to identify the information practices of trusted entities rather than
to identify their misbehavior.
Capsuling of identity and policy
In this model, a DM manages personal data in accordance with policies that
dictate how it is to be managed. If the DM needs to provide a DC with personal
data, the DM encapsulates the data and related policy and transfers both to the
DC.
The DC complies with the policy agreed upon and received from the
DM prior to the data reception. This tight coupling of personal data and
management policy prevents the DM from disclosing data to untrusted entities
and enables it to control the data practices of DCs even after they receive the
data.
The policies in the model have several aspects. The policies for DMs
represent privacy constraints and conditions for how personal data is to be
handled.
• Purpose: The context or the ways in which the data may be used: e.g.,
“my health care information may be used only for my treatment, not for
research.”
• Recipient: The person or entity with whom the data may be shared: e.g.,
“my medical records may not be shared with hospital H0.”
• Retention: How long the data may or must be kept: e.g., “my medical
records must be kept for eight years after my last visit.”
• Tracking: A report about how the data has been used or maintained, which
is addressed in this work: e.g., “I need a report covering the last three years
from hospital H1 about how my immunization records were managed and
which organizations used the data.”
These constraints and conditions are requirements or obligations that need
to be satisfied or fulfilled by the DCs after receiving data.
Dynamic composition of data and policy
When a DM and a DC interact during the transfer of a DS’s data, they need to
evaluate the associated risk and cost. The DM is concerned that, if the DC uses
the data improperly, it will be accused of failing in its responsibility to protect
the data. The DC is concerned that, if it receives unnecessary confidential data,
the cost of data management and the risk of data leakage will be higher.
Therefore, prior to the transfer, the DM and DC negotiate and agree upon a
policy for handling and using the data. Note that policy negotiation, matching,
and conflict resolution mechanisms are not within the scope of this paper.
Here, if their policies do not match, data transfer simply does not take place.
We refer to the policy they agree upon as the agreed upon policy.
A key aspect of this model is the mechanism used to dynamically identify
the minimal amount of personal data needed and compose the corresponding
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policy. For restricting data disclosure, only those attributes of the DS’s per-
sonal data that satisfy the agreed upon policy are used to dynamically produce
an attestation, which is referred to here as an assertion. The assertion can
contain basic information, such as issuer and recipients, be electronically
signed by the issuer entity to enable detection of tampering, and be encrypted
and propagated in a secure communication channel.
Transfer link
To enable the DS’s data to be managed and controlled after it is transferred,
a scheme is introduced for maintaining the relationship between a DM and a
DC. This relationship is referred to as an identity transfer link from the DM
to the DC. This link indicates that the DM has propagated a DS’s data to the
DC following agreement on a policy. In other words, the DM is responsible
for tracking the DC’s usage of the DS’s data whereas the DC is responsible for
reporting to the DM on how the data has been used or is being maintained if
it is so requested. In a graph formed by nodes representing entities and edges
representing transfer links, from a DC’s viewpoint, the DM is called a parent,
for explanatory convenience. Likewise, from a DM’s viewpoint, a DC is called
a child.
Transfer link management
This section explains the fundamental operations of identity transfer and
accompanying link management based on the model described in Sec-
tion “Model”.
Transfer link creation
When an entity issues and propagates an assertion about a DS to another
entity, a transfer link for the assertion is newly created for the lifecycle
management of the DS’s data. A transfer identifier is allocated to the link for
use in this management. A DM creating a new transfer link is referred to as
the initial DM; it does not have a parent.
Figure 1 illustrates the situation in which a transfer link from entity p to
entity q is created. As described in Section “Model”, assertion transfer entity
p acts as the DM, and entity q acts as a DC.
A set of assertions issued by entity p to entity q is referred to as A(p, q) =
{ap,q0 , ap,q1 , · · · }. The assertions issued by p may depend on their recipient,





q, because they may contain information about the DS that is private and
confidential to p and q.
Algorithm 1 shows the procedure for a utility function that is used in
algorithms explained later. When this function is called, a new transfer link
object is created (step 1); the transfer identifier for the link, parent, incoming
assertion (IA), and child data is set (steps 2–5). After a new store for outgoing
assertions (OA) is created, a new assertion is added to the OA, and the function
returns the new link (steps 6–8).
Algorithm 1 new_transLink(x, y, a, b , id)
1: l ← new_link()
2: l.trans_id ← id
3: l.parent ← x
4: l.IA ← a
5: l.child ← y
6: l.OA ← new_array()
7: l.OA.add(b)
8: return l
Algorithm 2 shows the procedure for transfer link management for p when
p propagates an assertion to q. It is assumed that p and q have an agreed upon
policy for exchanging a set of specific data.
Algorithm 2 create_transLink(p, q)
Require: p = q, p and q have an agreed upon policy.
1: ap,q ← create_assertion()
2: ap,q.trans_id ← generate_id()
3: ap,q.issuer ← p
4: ap,q.policy ← create_policy(p, q)
5: sign(ap,q)
6: l ← new_transLink(null, q, null, ap,q, ap,q.trans_id)
7: L(p).add(l)
8: send_assertion(q, ap,q)
The ap,q and l denote an assertion and a transfer link from p to q, re-
spectively; x.(·) indicates x’s attribute information. The ap,q is produced using
information about the new transfer identifier, the issuer, and the agreed upon
policy obtained through policy negotiation between p and q (steps 1–4). The
ap,q is signed by p, a transfer link is created, and its attribute information is
set using Algorithm 1 (steps 5–6). In this case, the link does not have a parent
since ap,q is originally issued on the basis of the stored personal data managed
by p whereas the child is a recipient of assertion q. The link is registered in
L(p), which is a link table managed by p, and then ap,q is sent from p to q
(steps 7–8).
Table 1 shows an example link table for DM p. It contains one transfer
link and shows the transfer identifier, parent, incoming assertion, child, and
outgoing assertions.
Persistent data tracking mechanism 645
Table 1 Link table used by DM p to receive and send assertions
Trans_ID Parent Incoming assertion Child Outgoing assertions
123 null null q {ap,q}
Once q has received ap,q from p, it begins acting as a DC for p; the details
of the procedure are omitted here (see Algorithm 6 in Section “Cyclic link
detection”). The DC entity manages a transfer link table like the one shown in
Table 2: q registers the incoming assertion, ap,q, its transfer identifier, which is
associated with ap,q, and parent.
Transfer management revocation
A DM managing a transfer link cannot delete the link at its own discretion.
However, events at its parent or child, such as data update and deletion, can
trigger the DM to delete the corresponding link and send a link revocation
request to other entities.
Algorithm 3 shows the procedure for transfer management revocation for
DM p with a link to child q for assertion ap,q after a data update or deletion
has taken place.
Algorithm 3 revoke_mgt(p, q, ap,q)
Require: ∃l ∈ L(p); l.child = q, ap,q ∈ l.OA
1: l.OA.del(ap,q)
2: if l.OA = {φ}, then
3: L(p).del(l)
4: end if
5: send_revokeRequest(q, l, ap,q)
First, p finds and deletes ap,q from the list of transfer links L(p) (step 1).
Then, if the list has no assertion information (step 2), the list is deleted
from L(p) (step 3). Finally, p sends a message informing child q that the
management of link l has ended (step 5). The description of this protocol is
omitted here.
The timing of a DM performing this revocation procedure depends on its
management policy. For instance, even if the DM receives a report from a DC
about the deletion of data, the DM may keep the corresponding transfer link
for a predefined duration and possibly request a check on data existence at the
DC (See Section “Enforcement of identity management policies”).
Table 2 Link table used by DC q to receive assertions
Trans_ID Parent Incoming assertion Child Outgoing assertions
123 p ap,q null null
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Entity q receiving such a revocation request from parent entity p would fol-
low the procedure described by Algorithm 4. The following link management
operation is performed after the revocation.
Algorithm 4 receive_revokeReq(p, q, ap,q)
Require: ∃l ∈ L(q); l.parent = p, l.IA = ap,q
1: if policy permits, then
2: l.parent ← null
3: r ← l.child
4: for all i such that aq,ri ∈ l.OA do
5: l.OA.del(aq,ri )




Algorithm 4 is based on the assumption that q finds an existing transfer link
l related to assertion ap,q on the basis of the link information in the revocation
request in Algorithm 3; l.IA denotes an incoming assertion that corresponds to
the link.
When a revocation request with assertion ap,q is received from p, the
corresponding outgoing assertions are sought if the management policy of q
permits the request (step 1). For the parent of q, the value null is assigned as
the links that can be revoked (step 2). The child of q related to ap,q is r (step 3).
The revocation operation is executed for each outgoing assertion aq,ri (steps 4–
7); i.e., aq,ri is deleted from l.OA (step 5). The revocation request for link l and
aq,ri is then performed recursively (step 6). After this is done for all outgoing
assertions, l is deleted from the link table L(q) (step 8).
Transfer Chaining
When a DC managing DS data obtained from a DM propagates the data to
another entity, one more transfer link is newly created. Figure 2 illustrates
the situation in which a new link between entities q and r is created given the
situation illustrated in Fig. 1. Initially, q acts as DC for p, and then it acts as
DM for r after the link chaining operation.
Algorithm 5 is a series of steps related to transfer link management by q
when it propagates assertion aq,r to r. The assertion is produced using ap,q
assuming that q has received ap,q from p and that there is a corresponding
transfer link for ap,q.




p q rlink (newly created)
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Algorithm 5 chain_transLink(q, r, ap,q)
Require: ∃l ∈ L(q), l.parent = p, l.IA = ap,q. Information to be sent from q
to r is originally contained in ap,q; q = r, q = p, and r = p.
1: if ap,q.policy permits agreed upon policy between q and r, then
2: aq,r ← ap,q
3: else
4: aq,r ← create_assertion(ap,q)
5: aq,r.issuer ← q
6: aq,r.trans_id ← ap,q.trans_id
7: aq,r.policy ← create_policy(q, r, ap,q.policy)
8: sign(aq,r)
9: end if
10: l.child ← r
11: l.OA.add(aq,r)
12: send_assertion(r, aq,r)
As Algorithm 5 shows, there are two cases for q sending an assertion to r.
In one case, q forwards ap,q without any update to r. The assertion does not
contain any private data or confidential information belonging to the DS that
is shared only between p and q. Therefore, q and r agree on a data handling
policy that is exactly the same as the policy attached to the original assertion,
ap,q, and the policy is simply passed from q to r (steps 1–2).
In the other case, q creates a new assertion based on information in the
original assertion, ap,q, issued by p (step 4). Although the issuer of the new
assertion, aq,r, is q, its transfer identifier is that of ap,q so that the transfer of
aq,r is associated with ap,q (steps 5–6). The agreed upon policy for aq,r is newly
created and set reflecting the original policy and policy negotiation between q
and r, ap,q.policy (step 7). The aq,r is then signed by q (step 8). The child of q is
set to the recipient entity, r, and aq,r is sent after it is registered in the existing
list of outgoing assertions for the existing link (steps 10–12).
Cyclic link detection
It is possible for link paths among entities to form a cycle (cyclic link), as
illustrated in Fig. 3. Detecting and avoiding cyclic paths is essential for proper
link management.








In the example shown in Fig. 3, the paths produced by transfer links p-q,
q-r, and r-p form a cycle. In this case, p acts as a DM, providing q with a DS’s
data. It also receives the same information from r acting as a DC and DM. As
a result, data operations could continue indefinitely or work inappropriately.
A transfer identifier in the model detects such links. Prior to propagating
information, a DM checks that the recipient is not the entity itself or a parent
that had propagated the information acting as a DM. That is, before q transfers
information to r, it confirms that r is not p’s parent. The procedures for an
entity receiving an assertion from another entity, using a transfer identifier,
are shown in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 receive_assertion(u, v, au,v)
Require: ∀lm ∈ L(u); ¬(lm.trans_id = au,v.trans_id)
1: if ∃l ∈ L(v); l.parent = null, l.child = w, av,w0 ∈ l.OA, l.trans_id =
au,v.trans_id, then
2: if data is latest and policy is satisfied, then
3: if w = au,v.issuer, then
4: revoke_mgt(v, w, av,w0 )
5: else
6: update_data(v, w, av,w0 )
7: end if
8: else
9: cancel the transfer
10: end if
11: else
12: l ← create_transLink(u, null, au,v, null, au,v.trans_id)
13: L(v).add(l)
14: end if
If v (possibly a DC) receives au,v from u, it checks whether v itself is the
original issuer of the assertion and is maintaining a corresponding transfer link
as a DM for other DCs (step 1). If step 1 is true and if the data contained in
the assertion is the latest (step 2), the role of v in relation to u is changed to
DC because u acts as a DM although v was the initial DM. If w is the issuer of
the received assertion, v sends a request to revoke the link to w to avoid link
inconsistency using Algorithm 3 (steps 3–4).
Otherwise, v sends a data update request to w (step 6). Before the data is
updated, its policy is also updated, u and w negotiate and agree upon policy on
the basis of the original policy. A new assertion is created in update_data(·)
containing the updated policy and sent to w. If v has no need to update its
original data using the received data, it cancels the data transfer and, to avoid
cyclic links, does not create a new link (steps 8–9). If there is no corresponding
link related to au,v (step 11), a new link is created; its transfer identifier, parent
information, and incoming assertion au,v are set in the link, and the link is
added to link table L(v) (steps 12–13).
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Enforcement of identity management policies
This section describes the mechanism for enforcing policies that enable DSs
to manage their identities with assistance from a DM. Once a DS has checked
and verified his or her personal data, the DM acts appropriately to optimize
the deployment of the data, enforcing the DS’s pre-defined policies.
The identity management policies are rule-based and specified in a declar-
ative language. The flexibility of logic representation enables DMs to easily
incorporate DSs’ preferences about how their personal data are to be used.
The proposed rule-based policies take the following form:
h ⇐ b 1 ∧ b 2 ∧ . . . ∧ b m,
where h and bi are literals that consist of respectively a head rule and body
rules represented in first-order logic. The ⇐ and ∧ operators respectively
specify reverse implication and logical conjunction of the rules. The head rule
specifies an action for identity governance if the conditions of the correspond-
ing body rules are satisfied. The body rules are constraints for triggering the
head rule.
The following subsections focus on three types of identity management
policies and their enforcement. These policies are at the meta-level and
characterize the proposed model because the actions resulting from their
enforcement invoke the transfer link management operations described in
Section “Transfer link management”. Since each action has a set of constraints
as possible instances, additional constraints can be encoded into the original
rules.
Reporting policies
A reporting policy specifies the rule to be followed by a DM upon receipt of
a request from a DS for information about the practices being followed by the
DM regarding the DS’s personal data. A reporting rule for DS u takes the
form:
doable(report(u, t1, t2, n, b , p)) ⇐ lt(t0 + itv, t) ∧ interval(u, itv)




The axiom doable indicates that the action report with the specified argu-
ments can and should be executed upon request if all the following constraints
are satisfied.
• Frequency: A report is provided at specified periodic intervals (e.g.,
“monthly”). Function lt(x, y) returns true if x < y. Parameters t0 and t are
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respectively the time when the latest report was produced and the current
time. DS u specifies time interval constant itv by using interval(u, itv).
• Duration: DS u specifies the duration for the report of events related to u
by specifying startTime(u, t1) and endTime(u, t2).
• Report detail level: DS u specifies content level n for the report by
specifying reportLevel(u, n).
• Recursive reporting: DS u specifies whether the report should include sub-
reports from all DCs to which the DS’s personal data has been propagated
by setting recursiveOpt to either true or false.
• Entity selection: DS u specifies in his or her preferences the DMs that are
to provide a report. Function in(x, y) returns true if x is a member of y.
DM p is included in the DMs specified in selectedEntities(u).
Testing policies
Whereas the reporting described above is a comprehensive history for a
specific interval, testing represents a snapshot of the specified data. It is
done to determine whether a DC has been handling a DS’s personal data
appropriately. A testing policy specifies the rule to be followed by DCs when
providing the current status of propagated personal data.
doable(testing(u, p, a)) ⇐ in(a, selectedAssertions(u))
∧ equals(recipient(a), p).
Action testing with the specified arguments can and should be executed
upon request if the following constraint is satisfied.
• Assertion selection: DS u specifies the assertions for which he or she
wishes the status to be tracked. Assertion a is included in the assertions
specified in selectedAssertions(u). Function equals(x, y) returns true if
x = y. Function recipient(a) returns the identifier of the recipient of
assertion a.
A DM receives a response as a result of the testing operation using the
above policy and checks whether the result is consistent with the expected
one. For example, if the DM expects that an assertion has been deleted at a
DC, but the testing result from the DC shows that it still has the data for the
assertion, the DC determines that the DC has handled the data inappropriately
and either warns the DC to delete the data or degrades the trustworthiness of
the DC.
Tracking termination policies
A tracking termination policy specifies the rule to be followed when termi-
nating tracking activities such as reporting and testing by DMs and DCs. It
specifies how long a DS has had a relationship with them, that the DS wants
to know their practices regarding the DS’s personal data, and under what
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conditions the relationship is to be terminated. These specifications depend
on the DS’s preferences and may cover many possible criteria.
A tracking termination policy is a meta-policy incorporating both reporting
and testing policies. If it is executed, the corresponding reporting and testing
policies are revoked. This triggers revocation of the corresponding transfer
links. Transfer links from a DM to a DC remain until the DS specifically
revokes them at the DM since they are needed for tracking the corresponding
personal data status even after the data has been deleted from the DC (see
Section “Transfer management revocation”). For example, in the following
tracking termination rule specified by a DS at a DM,
doable(terminateTracking(u, p, a)) ⇐ gt(trustVal(p), vt(u))
∧ lt(riskVal(u, a), vr(u))
∧ in(a, assertions(u, p))
∧ lt(tex(u, a), t),
action terminateTracking triggers transfer link revocation with the defined
arguments if the following constraints are satisfied:
• Trust evaluation: DS u does not require a DC to be tracked as a well
trusted one if its degree of trustworthiness, represented by a trust metric
calculated by the DM, is greater than threshold value vt(u) specified by u.
Function gt returns true if x > y. trustVal(p) denotes the calculated trust
value for DC p.
• Risk evaluation: This constraint is related to the risk inherent in data prop-
agation. The degree of risk is quantitatively calculated from economic and
privacy viewpoints. Function riskVal(u, a) returns the risk value related to
assertion a and DS u; vr(u) is a constant value specified by u. Assertion a
is included in the list of assertions, assertions(u, p), issued by the DM to p
for u.
• Expiration: This constraint sets a due date regarding an assertion provided
to a DC. Function tex(u, a) returns the expiration date for a specified by u.
Parameter t is the current time.
Although this rule is an instance of automating tracking termination by
means of a set of decision-making predefined in accordance with the prefer-
ences of the DS, the DS can easily modify the preferences at any time. The DS
can also choose not to automate some or all of the decision-making process
but rather to take action manually at any point in time.
When the terminateTracking operation is executed, transfer link revocation
is invoked in accordance with Algorithm 7.
DM p searches its link table for transfer links with empty parent information
as root links (step 1). If the conditions of the corresponding body rules are
satisfied for terminating the tracking of assertion ap,q (step 2), p invokes
function revoke_mgt (Algorithm 3), in which a link revocation request is sent
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Algorithm 7 call_linkRevocation(u, p, q, ap,q)
1: for all i such that li ∈ L(p); l.parent = null, l.OA = ap,q do
2: if doable(terminateTracking(u, q, ap,q)) = true, then
3: revoke_mgt(p, q, ap,q)
4: end if
5: end for
to DC q (step 3). This causes q to update the corresponding link information in
its link table in accordance with Algorithm 4 and its own tracking termination
policies.
Discussion
This section discusses several topics and issues related to the proposed model
and framework.
Trust
The proposed model assumes that trusted entities act in conformity with their
agreements in a collaborative fashion. Since personal data can be potentially
misused once it is disclosed to an entity if it is not encrypted even if the
entity has agreed on a policy for its usage, detecting entity misbehavior is an
open issue. An alternative for this issue is analysis of testing and reporting
operations with various types of parameters to find inconsistency in DCs’
reports.
However, the proposed approach is simply a foundation for improving
identity governance because many current applications do not support the
reporting of personal data usage and because the exchange of personal data
between untrusted entities is unrealistic in practical business situations. The
proposed framework is effective for managing trust because it provides a
means for each participating entity to manage and update the trustworthiness
of other entities if trustworthy reports are accumulated from the same entity.
In addition, if data leakage takes place, the tracking results can be used to
investigate and identify the cause of a misuse event and to determine where
responsibility for it lies.
Design and implementation
In a high-level system architecture for the proposed model, functions of trans-
fer link management, data reporting, and policy management are necessary for
both DMs and DCs in addition to core identity management functions such as
identity federation and attribute exchange.
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The transfer link management operations are incorporated into assertion
creation and propagation operations, as evidenced by the algorithms in Sec-
tion “Transfer link management”. The overhead for the link operations is lim-
ited although an overall implementation and feasibility study of the proposed
framework remains for future work. The operations for revoking transfer links
can be done asynchronously with the assertion operations to reduce response
time overhead. The policy management function needs a logic rule engine for
managing personal data that reflects a DS’s privacy preferences and resolves
policy conflicts between entities.
Trackability
Although some may feel that a DM does not need to monitor the behavior
of a trusted DC, such monitoring provides a DS with the means to determine
the current status and track the usage history of his or her identity information
after it has been propagated. Although dependence on the trust relationship
may reduce communication costs related to reporting, such dependence prob-
ably would not offer a sense of security to the DS.
However, this trackability may lead a DM to accumulate personal data
about a DS. In the proposed model, a transfer identifier is associated with
every data transfer containing personal data. The identifier is a dynamic and
transient one that covers limited actions related to the usage of personal data.
Accountability
Entities are at risk of involvement in inappropriate data handling or disclosure
if problems such as unauthorized data disclosure are made known. Since
entities in different domains have different responsibilities related to data
practices, using this framework is an effective way to demonstrate that their
data handling actions have complied with the agreed upon policies. The track-
ing and reporting schemes used in the proposed framework enable entities to
improve accountability for their identity protection practices.
Auditing is an alternative method for entities to demonstrate the correctness
of their protection practices. In many cases, auditing authorities monitor the
identity management log for legal or compliance reasons in a centralized man-
ner. In contrast, the proposed framework takes a decentralized approach—a
DS can ask a DM to aggregate the data usage reports of its children.
Policy combination and conflict resolution
The three entities (DS, DM, DC) in this model have either policies or pref-
erences that need to be unified across all three entities to enable operations
using personal data although there may be conflicts among the policies and
preferences. A DS’s preferences regarding his or her personal data generally
take precedence over the DM’s privacy policy.
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However, if data related to a DS is security-related and not owned by
the DS, the DM’s own policies may take precedence. For example, although
information about a privilege for enjoying particular digital content is related
to a DS, the administrator may wish to enforce a policy that only the DS can
exercise the privilege to prevent the content’s unauthorized distribution. There
are several open issues like this that need to be resolved before the proposed
framework can be completely implemented.
Related work
There has been much research related to privacy and identity management.
This research is built on such technologies as identity federation and personal
attribute exchange.
The idea of controlling access to data even after it is disseminated has been
considered, especially in the area of digital rights management (Schneck 1999).
Casassa Mont et al. (2003) introduced a concept called “sticky policies”—
a handling policy is attached directly to a package of data. This is similar
to the basic idea of the model presented here—creating a tight association
between data and a policy for controlling its use. In their concept, a third
party is responsible for auditing policy enforcement whereas, in the approach
described here, the entity originally responsible for managing and propagating
the data retains control over the information practices of data users and
aggregates usage data in a decentralized manner.
There has been much work on privacy policy description languages and
constraints. The Liberty Identity Governance Framework (IGF) (Liberty
Alliance Project 2008) specifies privacy constraints. P3P (W3C 2002b) and
its complement, APPEL (W3C 2002a), provide means for expressing compre-
hensive user preferences. XACML (OASIS 2005b) specifies an access control
language and privacy extensions. Ahn and Lam (2005) proposed using a user
preference expression language in federated identity management systems.
Zhang et al. (2003) presented a rule-based framework in which users’ policies
are represented in a declarative language.
Privacy enhancing technologies and privacy management are important
topics for identity management. Squicciarini et al. (2007) proposed providing
a new set of assertions to define the privacy related properties of a federation
system. Paci et al. (2009) proposed an approach for the controlled release of
identity attributes supporting selective and incremental credential disclosure.
The PRIME project (Leenes and Schallaböck 2008) provides a data track-
ing functionality that can be used to obtain information on the status of
data after it is released. This transparency feature as well as the focus on
managing policies, preferences, and data from a user’s viewpoint are relevant
to the work described here. Similarly, the PrimeLife Project (2009) and
EnCoRe Project (2010) aim at dealing with privacy management and users’
preferences.
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Baldwin and Shiu (2003) described an audit service that acts as a cen-
tral place for logging data received from other IT systems. In contrast, the
proposed model takes a decentralized approach in which data use reports
from multiple entities are integrated in accordance with the order of the data
propagation.
Mashima and Ahamad (2008) described a system that monitors the usage of
personal data and captures context information related to the requestor. Their
work is relevant to that described here in that both deal with the monitoring of
data usage. Their objective was to detect anomalous actions by impersonating
malicious users whereas the objective here is to reveal how personal data is
used and propagated from a privacy protection viewpoint.
Conclusion and future work
The model described in this paper supports lifecycle management of personal
data across domain boundaries using identity transfer links. Algorithms for
fundamental operations of link management enable determination of the
current status of data after it has been propagated. The proposed framework
enables users to control the propagation of their personal data in a user-centric
manner. At the same time, it helps participating entities to improve account-
ability for their data practices. Future work includes further investigation of
trust management and policy conflict resolution.
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